At any given point of time in an actual economy, some individuals hold more money than other individuals do. This non-degenerate distribution of money holdings among individuals is a rationale for a range of policies designed for reallocating liquidity among individuals. However, monetary theory has often abstracted from this non-degenerate distribution for tractability reasons. In this paper, we construct a tractable search model of money with a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. We model search as a directed process in the sense that buyers know the terms of trade before visiting particular sellers, as opposed to undirected search that has dominated the literature. In this model, the distribution of money holdings among individuals is non-degenerate. We show that this distribution affects individuals' decisions not directly, but rather indirectly only through a one-dimensional variable -the seller's future marginal value of money. This result drastically reduces the state space of individuals' decisions and makes the model tractable. We analytically characterize a monetary equilibrium, using lattice-theoretic techniques, and prove existence of a monetary steady state. In the equilibrium, buyers follow a stylized spending pattern over time, and the money distribution has a persistent wealth effect.
Introduction
Money is unevenly distributed among individuals in an actual economy at any given point of time. This distribution of money holdings has important implications for efficiency and welfare in the economy. In addition to the financial sector, a range of monetary and banking policies are designed to reallocate liquidity. For example, many central banks use open market operations and overnight markets to supply liquidity or channel liquidity from one set of individuals to
another. Despite such importance of a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings, monetary theory has often abstracted form it, largely for tractability reasons. In this paper, we construct a tractable model with a microfoundation of money and a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. We prove existence of a monetary steady state and analyze its properties.
A model should have at least three features in order to capture the importance of money distribution. First, the model should have a strong microfoundation for money by deriving a role for money from an explicitly specified physical environment. Only with such a microfoundation can one coherently assess the welfare effect of monetary policy. Second, money distribution should induce a wealth effect in the sense that different levels of money holdings yield different marginal values of money. This wealth effect is necessary for a redistribution of money among individuals to affect aggregate welfare. Third, the model should generate the spending pattern that an individual does not rebalance money holdings every period, even if he has the ability to do so. Instead, an individual should take time to run down the money balance. With this spending pattern, the wealth effect of money distribution is persistent.
The recent microfoundation of money (i.e., search theory of money) provides a coherent framework to explain the role of money. The theory models a market as being decentralized where each trade involves only a small group (usually two) of individuals and where the ability to keep record of individuals' trading histories is limited. In this environment, objects with no intrinsic values, such as money, can improve resource allocation. In addition to deriving a role for fiat money, search theory can be a natural framework for examining the importance of money distribution. Since exchange is decentralized, individuals experience different realizations of the matching shocks which naturally lead to a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. Such dispersion in money holdings can persist, in principle, because an individual with a high money balance may want to spend the balance down in a sequence of trades rather than all at once.
However, this microfoundation of money has imposed assumptions to make money distribution degenerate in order to maintain tractability. Since the distribution is an aggregate state variable with large dimensionality, it is difficult to characterize an equilibrium in which the distribution directly affects individuals' decisions. To avoid this difficulty, Shi (1997) there is no dispersion in money holdings among the buyers who enter the decentralized market. 1 We use search theory of money as the microfoundation of money, but we do not impose the assumptions to make money distribution degenerate. The main deviation of our model from the literature is that it models search as a directed process, as opposed to undirected search.
That is, buyers know the terms of trade before visiting particular sellers. In the model, there is a continuum of submarkets, each of which specifies the participants' matching probabilities and the quantities of money and goods to be traded in a match. Observing these terms, buyers choose which submarket to enter and sellers choose how many trading posts to maintain in each submarket. There is a cost of maintaining a trading post, and free entry of trading posts ensures that expected net profit is zero for every trading post. A matching function with constant returns to scale determines the total number of matches in each submarket. In equilibrium, individuals' decisions on which submarket to enter will ensure that the ratio of buyers to trading posts in each submarket is consistent with the specified matching probabilities.
In our model, an individual chooses in every period whether to be a buyer or a seller. Sellers are individuals who have spent their money down to sufficiently low levels and choose to produce.
We assume that production and sales are organized by firms each of which hires a large number of producers with the same preferences. A firm pays competitive wage and distributes profit to the producers according to each producer's labor input. In addition to production, a firm chooses the number of trading posts to maintain in each submarket. In equilibrium, all sellers exit production with the same amount of money. They have the same marginal valuation of money which is equal to the reciprocal of the nominal wage rate.
In contrast, buyers are heterogeneous in money holdings. But this non-degenerate distribution does not render our analysis intractable as it does in other models cited above. Directed search is critical for tractability because it makes the equilibrium block recursive in the following sense.
When search is directed, buyers with different money balances optimally sort themselves into different submarkets. With free entry of trading posts, sorting implies that the tightness in each submarket is independent of the distribution of buyers across submarkets. Hence, money distribution affects individuals' decisions and market tightness not directly, but rather indirectly only through a one-dimensional variable -the seller's marginal value of money. Such block recursivity drastically reduces the state space of individuals' decisions.
The pattern in which an individual in our model manages his money balance resembles that in a standard inventory model (e.g., Baumol, 1952, and Tobin, 1956 ). 2 An individual with the highest money balance chooses to consume frequently and consume a large quantity. He does so by visiting a submarket in which the matching probability, money spending and the quantity of goods traded in a match are all relatively high. After each purchase, the individual's money balance falls, and so he will choose next to visit a submarket in which the matching probability, money spending and the quantity of goods traded in a match are lower. This spending pattern continues until the buyer exhausts his money. Then, he will produce and sell goods to obtain the highest money balance, after which another round of purchases will start anew.
Money distribution affects resource allocation as follows. First, the distribution implies persistent dispersion in consumption. An individual with a relatively high money balance optimally chooses not to spend all of his money at once. Such an individual has a lower marginal value of money and consumes more (in probabilistic terms) than does an individual with less money.
Second, by affecting the distribution of individuals across the submarkets, money distribution affects the number of trades and, hence, affects aggregate output and consumption, even though individuals' decisions do not directly depend on the distribution. Third, by affecting sellers' marginal value of money, money distribution indirectly affects individuals' choices.
We analytically characterize a monetary equilibrium, prove existence of a monetary steady state, and analyze money distribution. The difficulties in analyzing the equilibrium are that a buyer's objective function is not necessarily concave and that a buyer's value function is not necessarily differentiable. As a result, we cannot assume, a priori, that the first-order conditions or envelope conditions hold. To resolve these difficulties, we use lattice-theoretic techniques (see Topkis, 1998 ) to prove that a buyer's optimal decisions are monotonic functions of the buyer's money balance. Using this result, we prove further that on the equilibrium path, a buyer's value function is differentiable and a buyer's optimal choices do obey first-order conditions. The validity of these standard conditions makes the model easy to use.
Our paper is related to the literature on directed search originated from Peters (1984) Finally, a few recent papers have studied the labor market using block recursivity, i.e., the property that the distribution does not directly affect individuals' decisions and market tightness.
In particular, Shi (2009) 
A Monetary Economy with Directed Search

The model environment
Consider an economy with discrete time. There are a large number of individuals who are evenly distributed over a finite number of types. The number of types is at least three. The measure of individuals within each type is normalized to one. Goods are perishable and perfectly divisible.
The individuals are specialized in production and consumption in such a way that no double coincidence of wants can exist between two individuals. No record of individuals' actions can be kept between periods, and a medium of exchange is needed in every trade. This role is served by a fiat object called money. Money is perfectly divisible and can be stored without cost. The stock of money per capita is a constant M > 0. The utility of consuming q units of goods is U(q) and the disutility of supplying l units of labor is h(l). The functions U and h are twice continuously differentiable and have the usual properties:
In every period, an individual can choose to be either a buyer or a seller, where a seller is also a producer. Production and sales are carried out through firms, each of which employs a large number of producers who have the same preferences. 6 A firm maximizes expected profit by choosing how much to produce and where to sell the goods. The cost of producing q units of goods is ψ(q) units of labor, and the cost of maintaining a trading post for one period is k units of labor. A seller supplies labor to the firm. The firm pays a competitive wage rate and distributes profit as dividends to the sellers in proportion to each seller's contribution. Firms enter the economy competitively so that all firms make zero profit in the equilibrium. The function ψ is twice continuously differentiable with the usual properties: ψ 0 > 0, ψ 00 ≥ 0, and ψ (0) = 0. Note that a firm here does not function as an insurance device for the sellers.
The goods market is decentralized and characterized by directed search. The market consists of a continuum of submarkets and each submarket can contain many trading posts whose number is determined by free entry. A submarket specifies particular terms of trade between a buyer and a seller, together with the matching probabilities. Search is directed in the sense that when choosing which submarket to enter, buyers and sellers know the terms of trade and matching probabilities in all submarkets. Matching in each submarket is still random, because buyers and trading posts there cannot coordinate. A matching technology with constant returns to scale determines the number of matches in a submarket. Once matched, individuals trade according to the terms of trade specified for that submarket. The commitment to the terms of trade precludes bargaining. In equilibrium, the matching technology and entry decisions together imply matching probabilities that are exactly equal to those specified for the submarket.
Let (x, q) denote the terms of trade in a submarket, where x is the amount of money that a seller receives from a buyer in a trade and q the amount of goods that a buyer receives from a seller. Let b denote the matching probability for a buyer in the submarket and s the matching probability for a trading post. To describe the matching probabilities, let N b be the number of buyers in a submarket, N s the number of trading posts, and N s /N b the tightness of the submarket.
Let the number of matches in the submarket be given by a function, M(N b , N s ). The matching probability for a buyer in the submarket is b = M(N b , N s )/N b , and the matching probability for a trading post is s = M(N b , N s )/N s . Assuming that the function, M (., .), has constant returns 6 No firm has the technology to employ producers with different preferences. This assumption is used to prevent barter from arising within a firm. If a firm could employ producers with different preferences, it would be possible for the firm to arrange multi-lateral barter trades among the producers. This role is not what a production firm performs in the market; rather, it is the role of middlemen whom we abstract from.
to scale, we can write the matching probabilities as b = M(1, N s /N b ) and s = M(N b /N s , 1). As buyers and firms choose which submarket to enter, the tightness in each submarket is a function of the terms of trade in that submarket. Thus, both s and b are functions of (x, q), as we will see later in (2.3) . For this reason, we refer to a submarket by (x, q) alone, although a submarket is described by (b, s) and (x, q) together.
It is convenient to express s as a function of b. To do so, solve the tightness, N s /N b , from
. Denote the result as
Because all properties of the function μ (.) come from those of M, we will treat μ (.) as a primitive of the model and refer to it as the matching function. We impose the following assumption:
Part (i) is a regularity condition. Part (ii) requires that if the matching probability is high for a buyer in a submarket, it must be the case that there are a relatively large number of trading posts per buyer in the submarket; in this case, the matching probability for each trading post in the submarket must be relatively low. We will show later that part (ii) implies that for any given amount of a buyer's spending, x, the quantity of goods obtained at a trading post must decrease with b in order to induce entry of trading posts into the submarket. Thus, for any given x, a seller's total cost of production is lower in submarkets with higher b. Part (iii) of the above assumption requires that this production cost be strictly concave in b for any given x. That is, producers must be compensated with increasingly larger reductions in the cost of production in order to create additional trading posts to increase buyers' matching probability.
This requirement is necessary for the tradeoff between the matching probability and the terms of trade across submarkets to yield a unique optimal choice of a submarket for a buyer. 7 The following example gives a matching function that satisfies Assumption 1: individual's money balance at the beginning of a period (divided by M ). Denote ω as the 7 We do not impose the assumption μ 00 ≤ 0, because it is neither necessary for the analysis nor reasonable for usual examples of the matching function.
marginal value of such normalized money in terms of labor so that 1/ω is the nominal wage rate.
We focus on equilibria where money has a positive value ω > 0.
Let V (m) be an individual's ex ante value function, measured before the individual chooses to be a seller or a buyer in a period. As is common, we will start the analysis by assuming that V (.) is continuous, bounded, increasing and concave. After analyzing individuals' optimal choices, we will explore the contraction mapping theorem to verify that V indeed has these properties (see Theorem 3.3). However, we do not assume that V is differentiable, because differentiability is not preserved by contraction mapping in general.
In every period, an individual first chooses whether to be a seller or a buyer and then makes the trading decisions. A firm chooses the number of trading posts in each submarket. We will analyze these decisions recursively, i.e., a firm's decision first, an individual's trading decisions second, and finally the choice between being a seller and a buyer.
A firm's decision
A firm chooses d N(x, q) for each (x, q), i.e., the number of trading posts in submarket (x, q).
Consider an arbitrary submarket (x, q). Let s(x, q) denote the matching probability for a trading post in the submarket. For a trading post in the submarket, the maintenace cost is k and the expected cost of production of goods (sales) is ψ(q)s(x, q) in terms of labor. 8 The expected money receipts from selling at the post are xs(x, q). Recall that 1/ω is the nominal wage rate. Hence, the firm's total demand for labor, l d , and profit, D, are given as follows:
The firm chooses d N(x, q) for each (x, q) to maximize profit. The expected profit of operating a trading post in submarket (x, q) is the expression inside the integral for D. If this profit is strictly positive, the firm will choose d N(x, q) = ∞, but this case will never occur in an equilibrium under free entry of trading posts. 9 If this profit is strictly negative, the firm will choose d N(x, q) = 0. If this profit is zero, the firm is indifferent about different non-negative and finite levels of d N(x, q). 8 The formula of the production cost implicitly assumes that the production cost must be incurred on the spot of each sale. This assumption is not necessary for our analysis, although it has been used in most search models of money. If production is centralized in a firm, instead, the marginal cost of selling goods in a trade is independent of the quantity of the particular sale because this quantity is negligible relative to the firm's total output. This case corresponds to the special case ψ 00 = 0. 9 More precisely, if d N (x, q) = ∞, the matching probability for a trading post in submarket (x, q) will be zero. In this case, the expected profit of operating a trading post in submarket (x, q) is −k < 0, which contradicts the optimality of the choice d N (x, q) = ∞.
Thus, the optimal choice of d N(x, q) satisfies:
where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. 10 This implies D = 0.
For all pairs (x, q) such that k < ωx − ψ (q), the submarket has d N(x, q) > 0, and (2.2) holds as equality. For all pairs (x, q) such that k ≥ ωx − ψ (q), the submarket has d N(x, q) = 0, and so s(x, q) = 1 and b(x, q) = 0. Putting the two cases together, we obtain the following matching probability for a trading post in submarket (x, q):
states intuitively that the matching probability for a selling post increases in the quantity of goods traded in a match, q, and decreases in the quantity of money traded, x. Note that for any given ω, s(x, q) and b(x, q) are independent of the distributions of buyers and trading posts.
A seller's decision
A seller chooses labor supply, l, at the competitive wage rate 1/ω. The disutility of labor is 
The optimal choice of l is unique. It is intuitive to expect that the higher a seller's money holdings, the less he wants to contribute to the firm. Moreover, a seller's end-of-period money balance, y, is strictly increasing in the money balance that the seller has at the beginning of the period. 11 Denote the optimal choice of l as l(m). The implied end-of-period money balance is
ω . The following lemma summarizes the properties of the optimal choice and a seller's value function (see Appendix A for a proof): Lemma 2.2. Assume that V (.) is continuous, bounded, increasing and concave. Then, W s (.)
is continuous, bounded, increasing, and concave. For each m, the optimal choice l(m) is unique and decreasing in m, while y(m) is unique and strictly increasing in m. For all m such that l(m) > 0, the function W s (.) is differentiable at m, the function V (.) is differentiable at y(m), and the optimal choice satisfies the first-order condition. That is,
We focus on the case where the optimal choice l(m) is interior. This focus is innocuous.
Because h 0 (1) = ∞, it is never optimal for an individual to choose l = 1, regardless of the individual's money balance. On the other hand, the choice l(m) = 0 may be optimal only if the individual's money balance m is sufficiently high, but no one will hold such a high money balance in an equilibrium. Even if an individual starts with such a high money balance, the individual will spend it down. Once that happens, the individual will never accumulate money back to such a high level that will induce l(m) = 0.
The above lemma holds for all m ≥ 0. Of particular interest is the case m = 0, because we will show later that all sellers enter production with zero money balance in the equilibrium. 
A buyer's decision
A buyer chooses which submarket to enter by choosing (x, q). It is more convenient to use (x, b)
as the choice variables. To do so, we express q as a function of (x, b) by substituting s = μ (b) into (2.3). For any submarket with ωx > k/μ (b), the substitution yields:
For any submarket with ωx ≤ k/μ (b), we can set Q(x, b) = 0. The function Q(x, b) gives the quantity of goods that a seller is willing to sell for the balance x with a matching probability 
Denote a buyer's optimal choices of (x, b) as (x * (m), b * (m)). The quantity of goods purchased by the buyer is q * (m) and the buyer's residual money balance after the trade is φ(m), where
We will analyze these optimal choices in more detail later in section 3.
The choice between being a buyer and a seller
The decision on whether to be a buyer or a seller is given bỹ
We cannot takeṼ as the ex ante value function V , becauseṼ is not concave for some m. It is easy to see that a buyer's matching probability is zero if m < k/ω. For concavity of V , we allow individuals to participate in lotteries before choosing whether to be a buyer or a seller. It is useful to clarify in advance that no lottery will be used on the equilibrium path (see section 4.1); however, it is necessary to specify the lotteries in order to define V for arbitrary levels of money holdings. Consider a two-point lottery, (L 1 , L 2 , π), where L 1 and L 2 are the realizations of the lottery and π is the probability that L 2 occurs. For an individual with money m, the optimal lottery and the value function solve:
Denote the solutions for L 1 , L 2 and π as L 1 (m), L 2 (m) and π(m), respectively.
Of particular interest is the lottery for low money holdings. This lottery specifies L 1 = 0 and L 2 = m 0 , and is depicted in Figure 1 . The tangent line connecting points A and B is the function
. Since L 1 = 0 in this lottery, the winning probability for an individual who puts m into the lottery is m/m 0 . Thus, the winning size m 0 is determined as
It is clear that m 0 is independent of the individual's money holdings m, provided m ≤ m 0 .
Moreover, we will show thatṼ is differentiable at m 0 , withṼ Let us calculate the change in the distribution in an arbitrary period. For any m ∈ [0, m * ], the change in the measure of individuals in this group before and after trading is:
The term d G (0) is the measure of producers before trade. Because all producers acquire the balance m * , they move above m after one period. The last term in (2.13) is the flow of buyers whose balances are reduced by trade from levels above m to levels less than or equal to m.
In a steady state, G(m) is also the measure of individuals in the next period whose holdings are less than or equal to m after the lotteries are realized. Then,
14)
The We can also calculate the distribution of trading posts across the submarkets. Because the buyers who hold a money balance m visit only the submarket (x * (m), q * (m)), the set of submarkets active in the equilibrium is:
In submarket (x * (m), q * (m)), the measure of buyers is d G(m). As an accounting identity, the number of matched buyers in every submarket must be equal to the number of matched trading
From this relationship we can compute the measure of trading posts in submarket (x * (m), q * (m)) as The equilibrium is block recursive in the following sense: Given ω, individuals' decisions and matching probabilities are independent of money distribution. The only possibility for money distribution to affect matching probabilities and individuals' decisions is to affect the one-dimensional variable, ω. In particular, for any given ω, the objects in (i) -(iv) above are determined independently of money distribution, and so the distribution can affect these objects only by affecting ω through the aggregate consistency condition (v).
Definition of a monetary equilibrium and block recursivity
Block recursivity is important for tractability because it drastically reduces the state space Similarly, a firm chooses how many trading posts to maintain in a submarket, knowing that the submarket will be only visited by the buyers with a particular money balance. With free entry of trading posts, the tightness in the submarket and, hence, the matching probability will be exactly equal to the one that delivers the optimal tradeoff for the particualr group of buyers.
Analyzing a Buyer's Optimal Decisions and the Value Functions
We devote this section to the analysis of a buyer's optimization problem, (2.8), and the value functions. One reason for doing so is that a buyer's optimal decisions are a main cause of a non-degenerate money distribution that arises in our model. Another reason is that the analysis is a challenge that requires significant deviations from standard approaches.
The difficulty arises because a buyer's objective function in (2.8) may not be concave jointly in (x, b, m), even if V is concave. One reason is that the objective function is the product of two functions; even if the two functions are concave, the product may not be concave. Another reason is that the objective function involves the difference between V (m − x) and V (m), both of which are concave in m. The lack of joint concavity of the objective function implies that the value function, W b (m), is not necessarily concave. Because the ex ante value function V is defined using V which, in turn, is the maximum of the seller's and buyer's value function, the lack of concavity of W b renders inapplicable most of the well-known methods for establishing differentiability of V (e.g., Benveniste and Scheinkman, 1979) . Without differentiability of V , we cannot presume that usual first-order conditions and envelope conditions apply. 12 To resolve the difficulty, we employ lattice-theoretic techniques (see Topkis, 1998 ) to prove that a buyer's optimal choices are monotone in the money balance, as stated in Lemma 3.1. Such monotonicity enables us to establish limited forms of differentiability of W b and V , as stated in Lemma 3.2, which are useful for establishing first-order conditions and envelope conditions.
Finally, we will prove that V is differentiable in Theorem 3.3. 13
To use lattice-theoretic techniques, let us use Assumption 1 on the matching function, μ (b), and the assumptions on the cost function, ψ (q), to derive the following properties:
It is easy to explain the monotonicity of Q. A higher money payment by a buyer induces a seller to sell a larger quantity of goods. On the other hand, for any given expenditure, a buyer must accept a relatively low quantity of goods in order to have a relatively high matching probability.
This is because the cost of production must be relatively low in order to induce firms to set up a large number of trading posts needed to deliver the high matching probability for a buyer.
Concavity of Q in x means intuitively that the marginal benefit to a buyer from a higher money balance is diminishing. Similarly, concavity of Q in b means that the marginal cost to a buyer of having a high matching probability is increasing. Note that part (iii) of Assumption 1 is used to ensure that Q is concave in b. Moreover, Q is concave in (x, b) jointly because
k, which is separable in x and b, and because ψ −1 is a concave function.
These features of ψ also explain why Q 12 ≥ 0, with strict inequality if ψ is strictly convex.
The property Q 12 ≥ 0 implies that Q is supermodular in (x, b), and strictly so if ψ is strictly convex. Since this supermodularity will play an important role in our analysis, let us explain it further. Consider two pairs, (x 1 , b 1 ) and (x 2 , b 2 ), with
That is, the additional benefit to a buyer from having a higher money balance increases with b.
Our model meets this requirement for the following reason. In submarkets where a buyer has a relatively high matching probability, the amount of goods that a seller is willing to sell for any given amount of money balance is relatively low. At such a low quantity of goods, a seller's marginal cost of production is low, and so a seller is willing to increase the quantity of goods by more for any given increase in the amount of money spent by a buyer.
The composite function, u(x, b) = U (Q(x, b)), has similar properties:
Note that regardless of whether ψ is strictly or weakly convex, concavity and supermodularity of u(x, b) are strict because the utility function U (q) is strictly concave.
Despite strict supermodularity of u(x, b), the objective function in (2.8) may not be supermodular in (x, b). To get around this problem, we decompose the maximization problem into two steps. In the first step, we fix b and characterize the optimal choice of x. For any given (b, m), the optimal choice of x maximizes the buyer's surplus from trade defined as follows:
Denote this optimal choice and the maximized function as Optimal choices of (x, b) are unique for each level of money balance because a buyer's objective function is strictly quasi-concave in the choices. Monotonicity of optimal choices is also intuitive.
Relative to a buyer who holds a lower quantity of money, a buyer with more money will choose to enter a submarket where he will have a higher matching probability; moreover, once he is matched in the submarket, he will spend a larger amount of money, buy a larger quantity of goods, and leave the trade with a higher money balance. As a result, a buyer with more money will obtain a higher present value.
Uniqueness and monotonicity deserve further remarks. First, a buyer is not indifferent between different combinations of (x, q, b) across the submarkets. Instead, a unique combination is optimal for a buyer, given the buyer's money balance. Second, buyers optimally sort themselves into different submarkets according to money holdings. Buyers with a relatively higher money balance choose to enter a submarket where x, q and b are all relatively high. Such sorting is important for the equilibrium to be block recursive, as explained at the end of last section.
The above features enable us to characterize optimal choices in more detail. For any given (x, m), the function t (x, b, m) defined in (3.3) is differentiable with respect to b. Since optimal choices are unique for each m, then for any given (x, m), the optimal choice of b satisfies the following first-order condition:
where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Note that this condition does not require differentiability of V . In contrast, the first-order condition for x * and the envelope condition do require at least a limited version of differentiability of V . We establish such differentiability in the following lemma (see Appendix C for a proof): Part (i) of the above lemma is not surprising, given that optimal choices are unique and monotone. Part (ii) states that for any given m such that the money constraint in a trade does not bind, a buyer's optimal expenditure, x * (m), is characterized by the first-order condition. In this case, even if V (m) is not differentiable at m, V is differentiable at φ(m), i.e., at the buyer's residual money balance induced by the optimal choice. Put in another way, the buyer will choose the spending optimally so that the residual money balance will not be at a level where V is not differentiable. This result can be explained as follows. Suppose that a spending level, x,
By reducing x marginally, the opportunity cost of spending decreases by a discrete amount. Since the marginal benefit, given by u 1 (x, b), falls continuously with the decrease in x, the net marginal gain must be positive. Thus, spending marginally less than x is strictly better than spending x. Also, part (iii) of the lemma holds at this residual balance.
Together, the results in Lemma 3.2 significantly simplify the characterization of optimal choices. In section 4.1, we will verify that the hypotheses in the above lemma are satisfied.
In this case, a buyer's optimal choices in the equilibrium satisfy the first-order conditions, (3.5) and (3.6), and the value functions satisfy the envelope condition, (3.7). 
Result (i) states that the ex ante value function is differentiable for all money holdings and that a buyer's value function is differentiable wherever the buyer has a positive trading probability.
Recall that a seller's value function is differentiable whenever l(m) > 0. Thus, standard firstorder conditions and envelope conditions hold for all individuals' optimization problems. Result
(ii) gives the relative level of various value functions. In particular, an individual will choose to be a buyer only when his money balance is relatively high and that, when his money balance is relatively low, he will participate in the lottery whose winning prize m 0 is defined by (2.12).
Result ( 
Part (i) of the above lemma states that a buyer with a balance m * strictly prefers trading to not trading and that a buyer will eventually run out of money after repeated purchases. Part
(ii) says that the ex ante value function is equal to the buyer's value function at m * . Part Another implication of Lemma 4.1 is that on the equilibrium path, a buyer's optimal choices are characterized by the first-order conditions, (3.5) and (3.6), and that the value functions satisfy the envelope condition, (3.7). We have explained earlier that the optimal choice of b always satisfies the first-order condition (3.5). For the optimal choice of x and the value functions, start with a buyer whose money balance is m * . Because V (m * ) = W b (m * ) by part (ii) of Lemma 4.1,
V is differentiable at m * , and the derivative V 0 (m * ) satisfies the envelope condition (3.7) (and is also equal to ω/β). Because φ(m * ) > 0, the buyer's optimal choice of spending, x * (m * ), satisfies the first-order condition (3.6) with m = m * . If φ(m * ) ≥ m 0 , then V (φ(m * )) = W b (φ(m * )) (see part (iii) of Lemma 4.1). In this case, the derivative V 0 (φ(m * )) exists and satisfies the envelope condition (3.7) with m = φ(m * ). This process continues until the T th time in which the buyer has a match. When entering the T th match, the buyer has a balance φ T −1 (m * ) ≥ m 0 . In this match, the derivative V 0 (φ T −1 (m * )) exists and satisfies the envelope condition (3.7) with m = φ T −1 (m * ).
Moreover, the buyer's optimal choice of money spending is given by the binding money constraint,
Equilibrium distribution of money holdings
The equilibrium path of money holdings described in the previous subsection significantly simplifies the characterization of the distribution of money holdings. The equilibrium path implies that the support of the distribution of money holdings, G, is Because no lotteries are used on the equilibrium path, (2.13) and (2.14) yield the following equations for the stationary distribution: 
The results in (4.5) are simple to explain. Because a buyer moves only to the next lower level of money holdings after each purchase, the outflow must be the same for all equilibrium levels φ i (m * ) in order to maintain a steady state. That is, b * (φ i (m * ))g(φ i (m * )) must be the same ina steady state for all i = 0, 1, ..., T − 1. Moreover, this outflow must be equal to the inflow from producers, as in the first line of (4.5). The last line comes from substituting g(φ i (m * )) into the requirement that the total measure of individuals in the economy must be equal to one.
Existence of a monetary steady state
In previous subsections, we have characterized the equilibrium patterns of spending for any given money distribution and any given marginal value of money of the sellers, ω. We have also characterized the equilibrium distribution of money holdings for any given ω. For existence of a stationary monetary equilibrium, it suffices to find ω > 0 that satisfies requirement (v) in the definition of an equilibrium. That is, a seller's marginal value of money must be such that all money is held by the individuals. Since the support of money distribution is given by (4.1), we can express requirement (v) in the equilibrium definition explicitly as result, we also show that other value functions depend on ω only throughm and that optimal choices of (m * ,m 0 ,x,φ,L 1 ,L 2 ) are independent of ω.
Suppose that V (m, ω) = v(m). First, we transform a seller's problem in (2.4). Note that V on the right-hand side of (2.4) is the ex ante value function in the next period. The money balance y that an agent brings to the next period will have a real value ω +1 y =ŷω +1 /ω, where ω +1 is a seller's marginal value of money in the next period. Thus, we can rewrite (2.4) as
Clearly, the optimal choice ofŷ depends on ω +1 /ω, but not on ω or ω +1 alone. In particular, a seller withm = 0 will acquire a balancem * that satisfies βv 0 (m * ω +1 /ω)ω +1 /ω = h 0 (m * ). Clearly, m * is independent of ω in a steady state.
Second, we transform a buyer's problem. Since ω appears in s(x, q) defined by (2.3) only through the term ωx, we can slightly abuse the notation to write a seller's matching probability as s(x, q).
Similarly, write the function Q defined by (2.7) as Q(x, b) and the function u as u(x, b). With the conjecture V (m, ω) = v(m), a buyer's problem can be transformed as
Again, the ratio ω +1 /ω appears on the right-hand side of the equation because the function v is the value function in the next period, which is defined as a function of future real money balancê m +1 =mω +1 /ω. Optimal choices (x * , b * ) depend on ω +1 /ω, but not on ω and ω +1 alone, and they are independent of ω in the steady state. Similarly, the residual money balance,φ =m −x * , is independent of ω in the steady state.
Third,ṽ(m) = max{w s (m), w b (m)}, and the ex ante value function is
and w b (m) depend on the ratio ω +1 /ω, so doṽ(m) and v(m). However, in a steady state, these functions are independent of ω or ω +1 . So are the steady state values of optimal choices, (L * 1 ,L * 2 ). In particular, the lottery for low money holdings yieldsL * 2 =m 0 . As before, the above process defines a mapping of v, which is a continuous and contraction mapping. Thus, a unique function v(m) exists which is independent of ω in the steady state. QED Let us remark on Lemma 4.2. First, only in a steady state are the value functions and real values of optimal choices independent of ω and ω +1 . Outside a steady state, these objectsdepend on the ratio ω +1 /ω. Second, the independence of these steady state objects on ω implies that money is neutral at an individual's level in the long run. Moreover, we can modify (4.5) to characterize the steady state distribution of the real money balance and show that this distribution is independent of ω. Thus, money is also neutral at the aggregate level in a steady state. Now, it is straightforward to solve ω from the requirement (4.6). Substituting the steady state distribution from (4.5), and using real values of the variables, we rewrite (4.6) as follows:
By Lemma 4.2,m * ,m 0 , andφ i (m * ) are all independent of ω in a steady state. Thus, for any givenm * , the steady state value of ω is uniquely solved as
# ,"
This solution satisfies ω ∈ (0, ∞), and so a monetary steady state exists. Uniqueness follows from the fact thatm * is unique (see part (ii) of Lemma 4.1).
The following theorem summarizes the above results and states other properties of the steady state (see Appendix F for a proof): Since lotteries are never used in the equilibrium, the frequency function of money holdings among buyers is a strictly decreasing function. That is, the higher the money balance, the fewer the number of buyers who hold that balance. This result arises because a relatively high money balance allows a buyer to trade with a relatively high probability, which reduces the measure of individuals staying at that level of money holdings in the steady state. 15 Similarly, the measure of sellers is smaller than the measure of buyers at any equilibrium level of money holdings, because a seller always becomes a buyer after one period of production.
A sufficient condition for money distribution among buyers to be non-degenerate in the steady state is that individuals are sufficiently patient in the sense that β ≥ β 0 . To see why this condition is sufficient, consider a buyer with the balance m * . The buyer can spend all this balance in one trade or in a sequence of trades. If the buyer spends all the money once, he consumes a large amount of goods in the period. Because the marginal utility of consumption is diminishing, there is a gain from spreading the purchases over several periods. The downside from doing so is time discounting. If the buyer is sufficiently patient, the gain outweighs the cost, in which case the buyer will gradually spend the money balance over time.
Recall that the ex ante value function is strictly concave at all levels of equilibrium money 
Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a tractable search model of money with a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. We model search as a directed process in the sense that buyers know the terms of trade before visiting particular sellers, as opposed to undirected search that has dominated the literature. In this model, the distribution of money holdings among individuals is non-degenerate.
We show that this distribution affects individuals' decisions not directly, but rather indirectly only through a one-dimensional variable -the seller's marginal value of money. This result drastically reduces the state space of individuals' decisions and makes the model tractable. We analytically characterize a monetary equilibrium, using lattice-theoretic techniques, and prove existence of a monetary steady state. In the equilibrium, buyers follow a stylized spending pattern over time, and money distribution has a persistent wealth effect. 
where F (l, m) is the objective function in (2.4). Hence,
Since the derivative W 0 s (m) exists (see (A.2)), taking the limit ε % 0 on the above inequalities yields To show that optimal choices have monotonicity as described in the lemma, we decompose the maximization problem into two: In the first step, we fix b and find the optimal choice of x;
in the second step, we find the optimal choice of b.
Take the first step. For any given (b, m), the optimal choice of x is denotedx (b, m) as in (3.4) . Because u(x, b) is strictly concave in x and V is concave,x exists and is unique. Note that t is separable in b and m, and so t has increasing differences in (b, m) (but not strictly so). Take arbitrary m 1 , m 2 , x 1 , x 2 , b 1 and b 2 , with m 2 > m 1 , x 2 > x 1 , and b 2 > b 1 . Compute:
Since u(x, b) is strictly supermodular in (x, b), we have:
That is, t (x, b, m) has strictly increasing differences in (x, b). Moreover,
The inequality follows from concavity of V (see Royden, 1988, p113) 
The inequality in the above result is strict if V is strictly concave. Thus, t (x, b, m) has increasing differences in (x, m), and strictly so if V is strictly concave. Because t (x, b, m) has increasing differences in (b, m), (x, b) and (x, m), it is supermodular in (x, b, m) . Since the choice set, [0, m], is also increasing in m, thenx (b, m) is increasing in (b, m) (see Topkis, 1998, p76) , and the maximized value of t is supermodular in (b, m) (see Topkis, 1998, p70) . 
where the inequality follows from concavity of V . Since the above result holds for all (x, b), then
Note that for the second inequality we have used the fact thatx (b, m 1 ) is feasible in the problem
Now consider the optimal choice of b, denoted as b
We show that f is supermodular in (b, m), and so the optimal choice of b is increasing in m. Take 
We can divide this problem into two steps: first solve q for any given (z, m) and then solve z.
For any given (z, m), the optimal choice of q, denoted asq (z), solves:
Note that q and J do not depend on m for any given z. It is easy to see that the objective function above is supermodular in (q, z), and strictly so if V is strictly concave. Since the choice set,
, is also increasing in z,q (z) and J (z) increase in z.
The optimal choice of z is z * (m) = arg max 0≤z≤ωm−k B (z, m), where
Note that if J (z) < βV (m), the buyer can choose z = ωm − k to obtain B = 0. Thus, focus on the case where J(z) ≥ βV (m). Under Assumption 1, it can be verified that the function μ −1 ( k ωm−z ) strictly increases in m, strictly decreases in z, and is strictly supermodular in (z, m). Thus, for arbitrary z 2 > z 1 and m 2 > m 1 , we have:
The first term on the RHS is positive because J (z) increases in z and μ −1 ( To show that φ is increasing, we formulate a buyer's problem by letting the choices be (φ, z), where z is defined as z = φω + ψ (q). From the definition of z and (2.3), we can express
The relevant domain of φ is [0, min{m, z/ω}], and of z is [0, ωm − k]. A buyer solves:
As in the above formulation where the choices are (q, z), we can divide the maximization problem into two steps. First, for any given z, the optimal choice of φ solves: 
whereφ is defined above andq (z) ≡ ψ −1 (z −φ (z) ω); (ii) The solution for z in (B.3) is unique and given by 
Again, we have used the fact that left-hand and right-hand derivatives exist for a concave function. 
Substituting this result for J 0 (z * ), we rewrite (B.6) and (B.7) as
To prove part (ii), consider any arbitrary m such that φ(m) > 0 (i.e., x * (m) < m) and consider the original formulation of a buyer's maximization problem, (2.8) , where the choices are (x, b). Since x * (m) < m, a procedure similar to the derivation of J 0 (z) in the previous proof but applied to (2.8) yields: 
On the other hand, concavity of
, and the common derivative is given by the right-hand side of (3.7). By (C.1) and (C.2), W 0 b (m) exists and is also given by the right-hand side of (3.7). 
, where x * i = m i − φ i and i = 1, 2. Because b * i > 0, the first-order condition for b, i.e., the condition (3.5), yields:
Moreover, because m 1 satisfies the hypotheses for both (3.7) and (3.6), subtracting the two equations yields:
This result shows that V must be strictly concave in some sections of [φ 1 , m 1 ].
Since the proofs for strict monotonicity of b * (m 1 ) at m 1 are similar in the cases m 2 > m 1 and m 2 < m 1 , let us consider only the case where m 2 > m 1 . In this case, we want to prove that
Subtract the first-order conditions for b * 1 and b * 2 (see above), and re-organize: 
The right-hand side of the above inequality is a strictly decreasing function of b * 2 , and it is equal to 0 when b
is strictly increasing at m 1 . Let us continue to prove the rest of part (iv). Since (3.7) and (3.6) hold for m = m 1 , we can combine the two equations to obtain:
Because b * (m 1 ) is strictly increasing at m 1 and V is concave, the right-hand side above is strictly decreasing in m 1 . In this case, the above equation shows that V must be strictly concave at φ(m 1 ) and that φ (.) must be strictly increasing at m 1 . Strictly concavity of V at φ(m 1 ) implies that W b (φ(m 1 )) = V (φ(m 1 )). To see why, suppose that the inequality does not hold. Because
). In this case, V around φ(m 1 ) must be a linear segment generated by the lottery in (2.11), which contradicts strict concavity of V at φ(m 1 ). QED
D. Proof of Theorem 3.3
It is easy to verify that the mapping F, defined by the right-hand side of (2. To establish other properties of V stated in the theorem, we start with part (ii). 
, to the contrary. In this case, both V (m 0 ) and V (m * ) lie on the same tangent line (or its extension) that connects V (0) and Continuing this process, we conclude that if φ i (m * ) > 0, then V (φ i (m * )) = W b (φ i (m * )) and V is strictly concave at φ i (m * ). QED
F. Proof of Theorem 4.3
The text preceding the theorem has established that a unique monetary steady state exists and that money is neutral in the steady state.
To prove that the frequency function of money holding among buyers is decreasing, note that Define (q, q, β 0 ) by the following equations:
U 0 (q) ψ 0 (q) = h 0 (ψ(q) + k); U (q) ψ 0 (q) U 0 (q) − ψ(q) = k; ( F . 1 )
We prove that if β ≥ β 0 , then φ(m * ) > 0, in which case T ≥ 2. To this end, suppose φ(m * ) = 0.
Shorten the notation b * (m * ) as b * and q * (m * ) as q * . Because φ(m * ) = 0, then
The first inequality comes from the optimality condition for φ(m * ) = 0, the second inequality from the fact that V has a strictly concave section in [0, m * ], and the equality from (2.6). The last inequality holds because h is strictly convex and ωm * = ψ(q * ) + k μ(b * ) ≥ ψ(q * ) + k. Substituting u 1 (m * , b * ) = ωU 0 (q * )/ψ 0 (q * ), we obtain the following necessary condition for φ(m * ) = 0:
This condition is equivalent to q * <q, whereq is defined in (F.1).
We prove that if β ≥ β 0 , then the supposition φ(m * ) = 0 leads to the contradiction q * ≥q.
With φ(m * ) = 0, the fact W b (m * ) ≤ V (m * ) yields:
Recall that V (0) = W s (0) = βV (m * ) − h(ωm * ). Using this equation and the first-order condition for b * (m * ), we solve for V (0) and V (m * ). Substituting the results into the above inequality yields:
Substituting u(m * , b * ) = U (q * ) and ωm * ≥ ψ(q * ) + k, and computing u 2 (m * , b * ), we get the following necessary condition for the above inequality: We will prove below that a(b * ) > ψ(q) + k. Thus, a necessary condition for (F.3) is
The left-hand side above is strictly increasing in q * for all q * ≤q. If β ≥ β 0 (where β 0 is defined by (F.2) ), the left-hand side above is non-positive at q * =q and, hence, strictly negative for all q * <q. Thus, if β ≥ β 0 , the supposition φ(m * ) = 0 leads to the contradiction q * ≥q. 
This condition is equivalent to q 0 > q, where q is defined in (F.1). Similarly, substituting u 1 , u 2 and ωm 0 ≥ ψ(q 0 ) + k, we have the following necessary condition for (F.6): a(b 0 ) > ψ(q 0 ) + k.
Because q 0 > q, then a(b 0 ) > ψ(q) + k, as desired. QED
